All known protocols implementing broadcast from synchronous point-to-point channels tolerating any t < n Byzantine corruptions have communication complexity at least Ω( n 2 ). We give cryptographically secure and information-theoretically secure protocols for t < n that communicate O( n) bits in order to broadcast sufficiently long bit messages. This matches the optimal communication complexity bound for any protocol allowing to broadcast bit messages. While broadcast protocols with the optimal communication complexity exist in cases where t < n/3 (by Liang and Vaidya in PODC '11) or t < n/2 (by Fitzi and Hirt in PODC '06), this paper is the first to present such protocols for t < n.
Introduction

Byzantine Broadcast
The Byzantine broadcast problem (aka Byzantine generals) is stated as follows [PSL80] : A specific party (the sender) wants to distribute a message among n parties in such a way that all correct parties obtain the same message, even when some of the parties are malicious. The malicious misbehavior is modeled by a central adversary who corrupts up to t parties and takes full control of their actions. Corrupted parties are called Byzantine and the remaining parties are called correct. Broadcast requires that all correct parties agree on the same value v, and if the sender is correct, then v is the value proposed by the sender. Broadcast is one of the most fundamental primitives in distributed computing. It is used to implement various protocols like voting, bidding, collective contract signing, etc. Basically, this list can be continued with all protocols for secure multi-party computation as defined by Yao [Yao82, GMW87] . There exist various implementations of Byzantine broadcast from synchronous point-to-point communication channels with different security guarantees. In the model without trusted setup, perfectly-secure Byzantine broadcast is achievable when t < n/3 [PSL80, BGP92, CW92] . In the model with trusted setup, cryptographically or information-theoretically secure Byzantine broadcast is achievable for any t < n [DS83, PW96] . Closely related to the broadcast problem is the consensus problem. In consensus each party holds a value as input, and then parties agree on a common value as output of consensus. In this paper we consider the case where any number of parties may be Byzantine. In this case the consensus problem is not well-defined, and hence we do not treat it here.
Efficiency of Byzantine Broadcast
In this paper we focus on the efficiency of broadcast protocols. In particular, we are interested in optimizing their communication complexity. The communication complexity of a protocol is defined by Yao [Yao79] to be the number of bits sent/received by correct parties during the protocol run. 1 Historically, the broadcast problem was introduced for binary values [PSL80] . However, in various applications long values are broadcast rather than bits. Examples of such applications are general purpose multi-party computation protocols and specific tasks like voting. Such a broadcast of long values is called multi-valued broadcast. In this paper we study the communication complexity of multi-valued broadcast protocols. Many known protocols for multi-valued broadcast [TC84, FH06, LV11a, Pat11] are actually constructions from a broadcast of short messages and point-to-point channels. Communication complexity of such constructions is computed in terms of the point-to-point channels and the broadcast for short messages usage. The security of the protocol is based on the security of the construction and the security of the broadcast for short messages. Let us denote the communication complexity of a short s bit message broadcast with B(s). The most trivial construction is to broadcast the message bit by bit, which is perfectly secure for t < n and has communication complexity B(1). The construction by Turpin and Coan [TC84] is perfectly secure and tolerates t < n/3 while communicating O( n 2 + nB(1)) bits. The construction by Fitzi and Hirt [FH06] is information-theoretically secure and tolerates t < n/2 while communicating O( n + n 3 κ + nB(n + κ)) bits, where κ denotes a security parameter. The construction by Liang and Vaidya [LV11a] is perfectly secure and tolerates t < n/3 while communicating O( n + √ n 2 B(1) + n 4 B(1)) bits (for the extensions of their approach for t < n/2 see Appendix A). The construction by Patra [Pat11] is perfectly secure and tolerates t < n/3 while communicating O( n + n 2 B(1)) bits. In this paper we consider the case where t < n. In this model existing protocols [DS83, PW96] were designed to broadcast bits, but since they are based on signatures (cryptographic or information-theoretic) they can be easily adopted to broadcast long messages. The protocol by Dolev and Strong [DS83] is cryptographically secure and has communication complexity Ω( n 2 + n 3 κ). The protocol by Pfitzmann and Waidner [PW96] is information-theoretically secure and has communication complexity Ω( n 2 + n 6 κ) [Fit03] .
Contributions
Consider any protocol for multi-valued broadcast. Since each correct player must learn the value proposed by the sender, the communication costs of the broadcast protocol must be at least Ω( n).
In case where t < n known protocols [DS83, PW96] communicate at least Ω( n 2 ) bits. In this paper we give two generic constructions for a multi-valued broadcast which allow to achieve optimal communication complexity of O( n) bits for t < n. The first construction is cryptographically secure and communicates O( n + n(B(κ) + nB(1))) bits. The second construction is information-theoretically secure and communicates O( n+n 3 (B(κ)+nB(1))) bits. The following table summarizes the communication costs of multi-valued broadcast protocols:
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Parties. We consider a setting consisting of n parties (players) P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } with some designated party called the sender, which we denote with P s for some s ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We assume that the parties are connected with a synchronous authentic point-to-point network.
Synchronous means that all parties share a common clock and that the message delay in the network is bounded by a constant. For a set of parties A ⊆ P we define A to be P \ A.
Broadcast definition. A broadcast protocol allows the sender P s to distribute a value v s among parties P such that:
• (Termination) Every correct party P i ∈ P terminates.
• (Consistency) All correct parties in P decide on the same value.
• (Validity) If the sender P s is correct, then every correct party P i ∈ P decides on the value proposed by the sender v i = v s .
Adversary. The faultiness of parties is modeled in terms of a central adversary corrupting up to t < n parties, making them deviate from the protocol in any desired manner. We distinguish two types of security in this paper: cryptographic and information-theoretic. Cryptographic security guarantees that the protocol is secure based on some computational assumptions (e.g., signatures and/or collision resistant hash functions), while information-theoretical (also called statistical) security captures the fact that even a computationally unbounded adversary cannot violate the security of the protocol with a non-negligible probability.
Protocols Overview
We present cryptographically and information-theoretically secure constructions for multi-valued broadcast. Both constructions are built over point-to-point channels and an oracle for broadcasting short messages. When describing protocols we often say that players broadcast messages, while meaning that they actually use the given broadcast oracle. On the highest level both constructions broadcast the long message block by block, where each block is broadcast using a special protocol for block broadcast. This block broadcast protocol achieves optimal communication complexity only in good executions, while in bad executions more bits need to be communicated. We select the number of blocks in such a way that good executions outnumber bad ones and the total communication complexity is optimal. Whether an execution is good or bad is determined using the Dispute Control Framework [BH06] . Dispute control is a technique which keeps track of disputes (also called conflicts) between players and ensures that occurred disputes cannot show up again. Intuitively, an execution is good if it is dispute-free, and bad otherwise. We employ the dispute control framework as follows. We consider a set of unordered pairs of parties ∆, where {P i , P j } ∈ ∆ represents the fact that parties P i and P j accuse each other of being Byzantine. Parties start a protocol by setting ∆ to be the empty set. Then during the protocol run they add new disputes to ∆ when they learn about new accusations. We ensure that ∆ always remains valid, meaning that if {P i , P j } ∈ ∆ then at least one of the players P i , P j is Byzantine.
Cryptographically Secure Construction
First, we present a protocol CryptoBlockBC for broadcasting blocks. CryptoBlockBC makes use of an external procedure for broadcasting short values and a set of disputes ∆. Then we plug CryptoBlockBC in the protocol CryptoBC, which broadcasts an bit message block by block q times. In each invocation of CryptoBlockBC we will use the same global variable ∆ with the disputes among the players. This means that if parties P i and P j conflict during some block broadcast, then they conflict in all later invocations of CryptoBlockBC. Then, we count the communication complexity of the resulting construction and select q which makes its optimal.
Block Broadcast Protocol CryptoBlockBC
The protocol CryptoBlockBC employs a collision-resistant hash function CRHash, i.e., no efficient algorithm can find two different inputs v, v with CRHash(v) = CRHash(v ). 2 In the beginning of the protocol the sender broadcasts a hash h = CRHash(v s ) of the value it holds. The goal of the protocol is to ensure that all correct players learn v s . All parties during the protocol run are divided into two sets: H and H. The set H consists of happy players who have already learned v s , and H who have not. At each iteration of CryptoBlockBC we try to move a player from H to H. We select a pair of players P x , P y such that P x ∈ H and P y ∈ H. Then P x sends the value it holds to P y . This procedure is meaningless if parties P x , P y are in the dispute, so the pair is chosen such that {P x , P y } ∈ ∆. Once P y receives a value from P x it verifies that its hash is h; in the positive case P y is included in H and in the negative case a conflict between P x and P y is found. Hence at each iteration we either include one player into H or we discover a new conflict between a pair of players.
Protocol CryptoBlockBC(v s ): 1. Parties initialize happy set H to be {P s }. 2. Sender P s : Broadcast h := CRHash(v s ). 3. While ∃ P x , P y ∈ P s.t. P x ∈ H and P y ∈ H and {P x , P y } ∈ ∆ do r.1 P x : Send v x to player P y . Denote received value by v y . r.2 P y : If h = CRHash(v y ) broadcast 1, else broadcast 0. r.3 If P y broadcasted 1 then parties add P y to H , otherwise they add {P x , P y } to ∆. 4. ∀P i ∈ P: If P i ∈ H decide on v i , otherwise decide on ⊥.
Lemma 1. Given that the initial dispute set ∆ s is valid and CRHash is a collision-resistant hash function, protocol CryptoBlockBC achieves broadcast (of v s ) and terminates with a valid dispute set ∆ e . Furthermore, the protocol communicates at most B(|h|) + (n + d)(|v s | + B(1)) bits, where d = |∆ e | − |∆ s |, |h| is the output length of CRHash, and |v s | is the block length.
proof First, we prove that at each iteration of the while loop all correct players in H always hold the same value v such that CRHash(v) = h. A player is included into H under condition that it broadcasts 1 at Step r.2, which he does only if it holds a value v with CRHash(v) = h. Hence for any two correct players P i , P j ∈ H it must hold that CRHash(v i ) = h and CRHash(v j ) = h. Since CRHash is collision-resistant it implies that v i = v j . 3 (Validity of ∆ e ) We show that whenever P x and P y are correct then {P x , P y } is not added to ∆ at Step r.3. A correct P x ∈ H holds v x with CRHash(v x ) = h and sends v x = v y to P y at Step r.1, who successfully verifies that CRHash(v y ) = h and broadcasts 1 at Step r.2, hence {P x , P y } is not added to ∆ at Step r.3. (Termination) At each iteration of the while loop either the happy set H or the dispute set ∆ grows. |H| is limited by n and |∆| is limited by n 2 , hence the number of iterations is limited. (Consistency) We prove that in the end of the protocol all correct players belong either to H (and decide on the same value v) or to H (and decide on ⊥). As shown above ∆ remains valid in all iterations, hence for correct players P x and P y the pair {P x , P y } ∈ ∆. Hence, if P x ∈ H and P y ∈ H then the while loop does not terminate. 
Constructing Broadcast for Long Messages
Now we plug in CryptoBlockBC in the protocol CryptoBC which broadcasts a message block by block.
Protocol CryptoBC(v s , q):
1. Parties initialize dispute set ∆ with the empty set. Since block broadcast is invoked q times, due to Lemma 1 the total communication complexity is at most
bits. We know that the sum of d i is upper bounded by the total number of possible disputes n 2 . Hence we have that communication complexity is upper bounded by qB(|h|) + (qn + n 2 )( /q + B(1)). By setting q = n we get that the total communication is at most 2 n + 2n 2 B(1) + nB(|h|) which is O( n + n(B(κ) + nB(1))). The following theorem summarizes the cryptographically secure construction presented in this section: Theorem 1. In the setting with t < n, the protocol CryptoBC with q = n achieves cryptographically secure broadcast of bit messages with communication complexity O( n+n(B(κ)+nB(1))) (where κ is a security parameter).
In order to obtain a concrete multi-valued broadcast protocol we instantiate CryptoBC with the protocol [DS83]: Theorem 2. The protocol CryptoBC with q = n and implementation of broadcast for short messages by [DS83] is a cryptographically secure multi-valued broadcast protocol for t < n and has communication complexity O( n + n 5 κ) bits (where κ is a security parameter).
Information-Theoretically Secure Construction
This section is organized similar to the cryptographic case. First, we present a protocol ITBlockBC for broadcasting blocks which is analogous to CryptoBlockBC, with the difference that it relies on a universal hash function instead of a collision-resistant one. As in the cryptographic case we then plug ITBlockBC in the ITBC protocol, which broadcasts a message block by block q times. Then, we count the communication complexity of the resulting protocol ITBC, and select the number of blocks q which makes it optimal.
Universal Hash Functions
Consider a family of functions U = {U k } k∈K indexed with a key set K, where each function U k maps elements of some set X to a fixed set of bins Y. The family U is called ε-universal if for any two distinct messages v 1 and v 2 ,
A ε-universal hash function can for example be constructed as follows: Let X = {0, 1} , K = Y = GF(2 ν ), and any value v ∈ {0, 1} be interpreted as a polynomial f v over GF(2 ν ) of degree /ν − 1. The hash function is defined as U k (v) = f v (k). We know that two distinct polynomials of degree /ν − 1 can match in at most /ν − 1 points. Hence, for any two distinct v 1 , v 2 ∈ {0, 1} ,
So, {U k } k∈{0,1} ν is a family of (2 −ν )-universal hash functions. We will denote a ε-universal hash function with ITHash.
Block Broadcast Protocol ITBlockBC
Similarly to the cryptographic case all parties during the protocol ITBlockBC run are divided into two sets: H and H. The set H consists of happy players who have already learned v s , and H who have not. The difference to the cryptographic case is that the set H is not monotonically growing-it may happen that the same player may be added/removed from H several times. At each iteration of ITBlockBC we try to move a player from H to H. We select a pair of players P x , P y such that P x ∈ H and P y ∈ H and {P x , P y } ∈ ∆. Then P x sends the value it holds to P y . Now player P y needs to verify that the value received from P x is the value that correct parties in H hold. In order to do so, P y broadcasts a key k for ε-universal hash function ITHash, and then P s broadcasts a hash h for this key. As long as P y honestly chooses k uniformly at random, with overwhelming probability correct players will obtain different hashes if they hold different values. If a party in H ∪ {P y } \ {P s } holds a value with a hash h, then he broadcasts 1, and 0 otherwise (the sender P s does not broadcast because if he is correct he can broadcast only 1). If every party broadcasts 1, then the iteration was successful and P y is added to H. Otherwise, some of the parties in H ∪ {P y } do not hold the right value and we search for new disputes. An important difference from the cryptographic case is that disputes may occur not only between P x and P y , but between any two parties in H. In order to find such disputes, one must be able to reason about the history of how H was formed. We will keep a history set T which will contain pairs of players (P x , P y ) such that P y learned the value it holds from P x .
Protocol ITBlockBC(v s ): 1. Parties initialize happy set H to be {P s } and history set T to be ∅. 2. While ∃ P x , P y ∈ P s.t. P x ∈ H and P y ∈ H and {P x , P y } ∈ ∆ do r.1 P x : Send v x to player P y . Denote received value by v y . Add (P x , P y ) to T . r.2 P y : Generate random k ∈ K and broadcast it.
If all parties broadcasted 1 -Add P y to H. else -For all (P i , P j ) ∈ T s.t. P i broadcasted 1 (resp. P i = P s ) and
Lemma 2. Given that the initial dispute set ∆ s is valid and ITHash is a universal hash function, protocol ITBlockBC achieves broadcast (of v s ) and terminates with a valid dispute set ∆ e (except with negligible probability). Furthermore, the protocol communicates at most (n + nd)(|v s | + B(|h|) + B(|k|) + nB(1)) bits, where d = |∆ e | − |∆ s |, |h| is the output length of ITHash, |k| is the key length of ITHash, and |v s | is the block length. proof First, we prove that at each iteration of the while loop all correct players in H always hold the same value v. More precisely, we need to show that if a correct player P y is added to H, then, given that all correct players in H hold the same value v, it holds that v y = v. We have that all parties in H ∪ {P y } \ {P s } broadcast 1 at Step r.3. This implies that P y successfully verifies that ITHash k (v y ) = h, and all correct parties in H verify that ITHash k (v) = h. Due to the fact that P y is correct, the key k is chosen uniformly at random, so given that ITHash k (v y ) = ITHash k (v), it must hold with overwhelming probability 1 − ε that v y = v. Second, we show that if the condition at Step r.4 is false then at least one new conflict is found.
We have that not all players in H ∪ {P y } \ {P s } broadcasted 1. Consider two possible cases:
(Exists P z ∈ H \ {P s } which broadcasts 0 at step r.3) For P z to be included in H there must exist a sequence of players P i 1 , P i 2 , . . . , P i k in H such that P i 1 = P s , P i k = P z and (P i j , P i j+1 ) ∈ T for all j = 1, . . . , k − 1 (see illustration in Figure 1 ). In the r th iteration some of the players in H stayed happy (P s and those who broadcasted 1) and some become unhappy (broadcasted 0). We know that P s stayed happy and P z became unhappy. Hence in a row P i 1 , P i 2 , . . . , P i k there are players of both types. Then we have that exist two players P iu , P i u+1 such that P iu stays happy and P i u+1 becomes unhappy. By construction of T , (P iu , P i u+1 ) ∈ T implies that {P iu , P i u+1 } is not yet in ∆. Consequently, the pair {P iu , P i u+1 } will be identified as having a conflict and will be added to ∆. (Each P i ∈ H \ {P s } broadcasts 1 at step r.
3) It means that P x broadcasts 1 (or P x = P s ) and P y broadcasts 0. Hence the new dispute {P x , P y } will be added to ∆. Now we proceed with the proof of the current lemma.
(Validity of ∆ e ) We show that whenever P i and P j are correct then {P i , P j } is never added to ∆. The pair {P i , P j } is added to ∆ only when P i sent some v to P j (i.e., (P i , P j ) ∈ T ), and they disagree for some key k whether ITHash k (v) equals h. Hence, P i or P j is corrupted.
(Termination) There can be at most n successive iterations where the set H grows (condition at Step r.4 is true). As shown above whenever condition at Step r.4 is false a new conflict is found. The number of conflicts is limited and so must be the number of the while loop iterations.
(Consistency) We prove that in the end of the protocol all correct players belong either to H (and decide on the same value v) or to H (and decide on ⊥). As shown above ∆ remains valid in all iterations, hence for any two correct players P x , P y , the pair {P x , P y } ∈ ∆. Hence, if P x ∈ H and P y ∈ H then the while loop does not terminate.
(Validity) The correct sender P s is always in H. The sender P s decides on v s and due to the consistency criterion all other correct players decide on v s as well.
(Communication complexity analysis) There can be at most n consecutive iterations, where no conflict is found, hence the total number of iterations is at most n+nd, where d = |∆ e |−|∆ s |. The communication costs of each iteration are at most |v s |+B(|h|)+B(|k|)+nB(1). So, the total communication costs of the protocol are upper bounded by (n+nd)(|v s |+B(|h|)+B(|k|)+nB(1)).
Constructing Broadcast for Long Messages
Similarly to the cryptographic case, we plug ITBlockBC in the protocol ITBC which simply broadcasts a message block by block. The protocol ITBC is a copy of the protocol CryptoBC with the only difference that CryptoBlockBC is substituted with ITBlockBC.
Protocol ITBC(v s , q): 1. Parties initialize dispute set ∆ to be an empty set. Due to Lemma 2 the total communication complexity is at most
This expression is bound by n(q + n 2 )( /q + B(|h|) + B(|k|) + nB(1)). By setting q = n 2 we have that communication costs are at most 2 n + 2n 3 (B(|h|) + B(|k|) + nB(1))) which is O( n + n 3 (B(κ) + nB(1))). The following theorem summarizes the information-theoretically secure construction presented in this section:
Theorem 3. In the setting with t < n, the protocol ITBC with q = n 2 achieves informationtheoretically secure broadcast of bit messages with communication complexity O( n+n 3 (B(κ)+ nB(1))) (where κ is a security parameter).
In order to obtain a concrete multi-valued broadcast protocol we instantiate ITBC with the protocol [PW96] :
Theorem 4. The protocol ITBC with q = n 2 and implementation of broadcast for short messages by [PW96] is an information-theoretically secure multi-valued broadcast protocol for t < n and has communication complexity O( n + n 10 κ) bits (where κ is a security parameter).
Conclusions
Existing multi-valued broadcast protocols achieve optimal communication complexity only for t < n/3 [LV11a] or t < n/2 [FH06] . In this paper we proposed the first broadcast protocols that tolerate any t < n Byzantine corruptions and achieve optimal communication complexity O( n) for sufficiently long messages of bits. One of the proposed protocols is cryptographically secure and the other one is information-theoretically secure. The cryptographically secure protocol is based on the security of the signature scheme and a collision-resistance of the hash function employed. It communicates O( n + n 5 κ) bits. The information-theoretically secure protocol may fail with a negligible probability and needs to communicate O( n + n 10 κ) bits. The presented constructions CryptoBC and ITBC leave room for different optimizations. In particular, it is an interesting task to optimize the number of rounds used. Our constructions require O(n 2 ) rounds (cryptographic one), respectively O(n 3 ) rounds (information-theoretic one). It seems that the obvious approach with simultaneously broadcasting many blocks does not improve the round complexity in the worst case. We leave the optimization of the round complexity as an open question for future research.
